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Eugenia Sainz
1  Evidentiality, intersubjectivity and ownership of 
the information: The evidential utterances with 
así que and que in Spanish
Introduction1
This paper focuses on utterances introduced by the conjunctions así que and 
que, when used at the opening of a conversation in absence of an explicit 
first member (Rodríguez Ramalle 2008, 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 
2016). The research questions are as follows: How is the evidential mean-
ing associated with the two utterances? Which semantic properties can 
be identified in each of them? What is their function in the interaction? 
The paper is structured in six parts: In the second section, the theoreti-
cal background for the analysis is presented, closely following the results 
produced from research into evidentiality (among others, Lazard 1999, 
2001; Ifantidou 2001; Plungian 2001; Nuyts 2001, 2006, 2012; Aikhenvald 
2004; Bermúdez 2005; Cornillie 2009; Cuenca 2015). Then, attention is 
drawn to the utterance introduced by así que. Thirdly, in order to refine 
the analysis and better capture the semantic properties of the evidential 
meanings, a comparison is made with the evidential utterance introduced 
by que (Rodríguez Ramalle 2016). The fifth section addresses the pragmatic 
function of evidentials in interaction (Fox 2011; Nucholls and Michael 
2014). Conclusions are offered in the last section. The language samples 
are drawn from the Corpus de Referencia del Español Actual (CREA). 
1 We would like to thank the reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions, 
which have been very useful for revising and improving the final version of this paper.
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Theoretical fundamentals for the analysis of the evidentiality
The concept of evidential modality
Evidential modality or evidentiality is understood to be the linguistic refer-
ence to the source of the information expressed in the utterance. Despite the 
clarity of the notion, the literature is divided concerning the way in which 
this must be understood, that is, the moment when it is acceptable to speak 
of evidential function in a language. Ifantidou (2001) clearly presents three 
theoretical positions that coexist now and which are only a reflection of 
the linguistic variation of a phenomenon that is very probably universal. 
In its broadest sense, an utterance has an evidential function if and only if it overtly 
communicates evidential information, whether this information is linguistically 
encoded or pragmatically inferred. More narrowly, we can regard a linguistic con-
struction as being evidential if and only if this information is not only communicated 
but encoded. More narrowly still, we can regard a construction as being evidential 
if and only if it plays a highly restricted syntactic role, e.g., as a clitic, particle, ‘dis-
course marker,’ bound morpheme or some other minor syntactic category. (Ifantidou 
2001: 161) 
So in the most restricted sense, we can talk about evidentiality only 
in the event that the reference to the source is codified in the grammatical 
system. This is the case for several indigenous languages of the American 
and Asian continents, and it is the theoretical position supported by, for 
example, Aikhenvald (2004: 4–6): ‘Linguistic evidentiality is a gram-
matical system (and often one morphological paradigm). In languages 
with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows something is a 
must. Leaving this out results in a grammatically awkward “incomplete” 
sentence.’ Like other European languages, Spanish lacks an evidential gram-
matical system, and it is therefore impossible to talk about evidentiality 
in the strictest sense. It does, however, possess adverbs and constructions 
from a lexical base that have codified an evidential meaning, such as, for 
example, como (Brucart 2009), evidentemente, aparentemente, al parecer, 
según parece, según dicen, por lo visto, desde luego (Martín Zorraquino 2011a, 
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2011b, 2013; González Ramos 2016; Torner 2016). The evidential meanings 
bound to certain verbal tenses, such as the imperfect, the conditional and 
the future have been already studied (Reyes 1994; Leonetti and Escandell 
2003; Bermúdez 2005; Escandell 2010; Rodríguez Rosique 2013; García 
Negroni 2016). There are also linguistic forms, such as the conjunction 
que and the illative conjunctions as así que, which, when interacting with 
particular forms of utterance, trigger an evidential meaning by default. 
Evidentiality can, then, be discussed in a broad sense. 
Parameters for the analysis of the evidential domain
Research carried out up to now on languages which have grammaticalized 
the reference to the source has highlighted the relevance or significance 
of two parameters for the analysis of the evidential domain: firstly, how 
information is accessed (Willet 1988; Plungian 2001; Aikhenvald 2004; 
Cornillie 2009), and secondly, who can access it (Nuyts 2001, 2006, 2012; 
Bermúdez 2005). The aforementioned parameters are useful for shedding 
light on the evidential domain in languages like Spanish, where the refer-
ence to the source must in most cases be inferred in a non-conventional 
way.
From the point of view of the means of access to information, it is 
usual to distinguish between direct evidence and indirect evidence (Willet 
1988; Cornillie 2009): 
Direct evidentials are used when the speaker has witnessed the action while indirect 
evidentials are used when the speaker has not witnessed the action personally but 
has either deduced the action or has heard about it from others. When the action 
is deduced, we are talking about inferentials; when information about the event is 
conveyed through others, they are called hearsay markers, reportatives or quotatives. 
(Cornillie 2009: 45) 
Direct evidence takes place when the speaker accesses the informa-
tion contained in the clause by means of his/her senses (sensory evidence, 
either visual or of a different kind) or by means of feelings (the endophoric 
evidence that Tournadre (1996) and Aikhenvald (2004) have documented 
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in languages in Tibet and in some American languages such as Quechua). 
Indirect or mediative evidence (Lazard 1999, 2001) happens when the 
speaker accesses information by means of inference, deduction or reasoning 
based on clues (inferential evidence) or in the case of information reported 
by others (reported evidence, with different possibilities depending on 
the more or less determined nature of the reference: hearsay2 quotative or 
popular tradition).3
The second parameter is the interactive dimension of the (inter)
subjectivity: who has access to the information (Nuyts 2001, 2006, 2012; 
Bermúdez 2005: 15–17). From this point of view, there are four possibili-
ties: the information contained in the clause a) is exclusive to the speaker, 
and consequently it is new to the listener; b) is shared by the speaker and 
by their interlocutor; c) is shared by the whole linguistic community, and 
d) is universal knowledge. We quote Nuyts (2001: 393–394): 
the dimension [of subjectivity] can be defined in terms of a difference in the status 
of the evidence and the epistemic evaluation based on that evidence from the per-
spective of the (knowledge of the) interaction partners in that situation. The alterna-
tives within this dimension could then be phrased as follows: one pole involves the 
speaker’s indication that (s)he alone knows (or has access to) the evidence and draws 
conclusions from it; the other pole involves his/her indication that the evidence is 
known to (or accessible by) a larger group of people who share the same conclusion 
based on it. In the former case the speaker assumes strictly personal responsibility 
for the epistemic qualification, in the latter case (s)he assumes a shared responsibil-
ity among those who have access to the evidence and accept the conclusions from it 
(including him/herself ). (Nuyts 2001: 393–394)
2 Anscombre’s omni-locutor (generic speaker) is of this type. As the author says, ‘The 
origin of a knowledge can be given to a discourse character without further ado, that 
is to say, without any sensorial or testing process’ (Anscombre 2014: 15).
3 See Plungian (2001: 351–352) and Bermúdez (2005: §2.1.1. 13–17). Whilst Willet’s 
typology is the most frequent distinction, it is not the only one. Equally interesting 
is Plungian’s (2001: 352–353) tripartite proposal, which distinguishes between direct 
evidence (that is, sensory or endophoric), deduced evidence (and within this, three 
types: synchronic inference, retrospective inference, and reasoning), and mediated 
evidence; a ternary system which is, in some languages, simplified to two: personal 
evidence (sensory or deduced) and mediated evidence. 
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The relationship between evidential modality and epistemic modality
Evidential modality and epistemic modality are two intimately related 
notions whose borders, as Cuenca (2015) points out, are blurred. The rela-
tionship between them is a controversial topic.4 There are, at least, two ways 
of understanding the relationship established in the literature: a restricted 
approach and an unrestricted approach. From a restricted perspective, 
evidentiality and epistemic modality are two related but different catego-
ries.5 From an unrestricted or broad perspective (Palmer 1986), eviden-
tials are markers of epistemic attitude; that is, they are encompassed by a 
larger domain of epistemic modality and contribute to the expression of 
the degree of certainty or the degree of commitment of the speaker with 
respect to what is said.6 
Nonetheless, even though evidentiality and epistemic modality work 
together in language, there are good reasons to keep the two categories 
separate. First, ‘evidential’ and ‘epistemic’ refer to two different things, and 
the fact that they are differentiated in the analysis allows certain things to 
be seen that would otherwise go unnoticed. The adjective epistemic refers 
to the degree of knowledge declared by the speaker, that is, a particular 
degree of certainty and of commitment regarding what was said and its 
truth value, and it is related to the notion of probability. By contrast, the 
term evidential refers to the source of knowledge, and it is related to the 
4 For an overview of the different positions, see Dendale y Tasmowski (2001: 340–343); 
Nuyts (2006: 11–12); Nuyts (2006: 10–12) and González Ruiz, Izquierdo Alegría y 
Loureda Lamas (2016: 13–20).
5 This is the position supported, among others, by Lazard (1999, 2001); de Haan (1999), 
Plungian (2001); Aikhenvald (2004); Nuyts (2005); Cornillie (2009); Nucholls and 
Michael 2014 (13–14); Albelda (2016), González Vázquez 2016. It is also the position 
that we assume in this paper.
6 This is the theoretical position which the Nueva gramática de la lengua española 
appears to take, where the ‘so-called evidentiality’ is defined as a ‘notion which 
describes the speaker’s personal compromise with the truthfulness of the transmitted 
information or the source from which the information comes from’ (NGLE 2009: 
I, §22.11h, p. 162–4). 
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notion of reliability: a source can be considered more or less reliable or 
accurate, that is, trustworthy. 
A second reason is that the two categories are related, but they do not 
correlate. Reliability is not probability. As Cornillie (2009) argues, if evi-
dentials were effectively at the exclusive service of the epistemic modality, 
it would be logical and expectable that a different evidential source (and, 
therefore, a different trustworthiness) would correspond to a differing 
degree of certainty. However, this is not the case. 
A source of information can be attributed to different degrees of reliability, but 
these should not automatically be translated into degrees of epistemic speaker com-
mitment. The latter involves an evaluation of the likelihood, which is quite differ-
ent from the evaluation of the reliability of the source of information. (Cornillie 
2009: 44)
Thirdly, the assumption of the epistemic purpose of evidentials does 
not help us to understand the speakers’ reasons to choose them. In fact, 
in the specific case of the utterances introduced by the conjunctions así 
que and que, the speaker’s attitude is one of certainty; this means that 
the evidential utterance expresses the same epistemic commitment as the 
unmarked utterance, and it behaves in the same way. The argumentative 
orientation is identical and does not change even when a mark of epistemic 
doubt or uncertainty is present (Anscombre 1995):
(1a)  ¿Así que María viene esta noche? Pon un plato más en la mesa. / #No pongas 
un plato más en la mesa. 
  [So Maria is coming tonight? Put an extra dish on the table. / #Don’t put an 
extra dish on the table.]
(1b)  ¿Así que a lo mejor María viene esta noche? Pon un plato más en la mesa. / #No 
pongas un plato más en la mesa.
  [So Maria may come tonight. Put an extra dish on the table. / #Don’t put an 
extra dish on the table.]
(2a)  Oye, que María viene esta noche. Pon un plato más en la mesa. / #No pongas 
un plato más en la mesa. 
  [Listen, María is coming tonight. Put an extra dish on the table. / #Don’t put 
an extra dish on the table.]
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(2b)  Oye, que a lo mejor María viene esta noche? Pon un plato más en la mesa. / 
#No pongas un plato más en la mesa.
  [Listen, María may come tonight. Put an extra dish on the table. / #Don’t put 
an extra dish on the table.]
Therefore, it follows that the reasons that lead speakers to prefer the 
marked utterance are not epistemic. When observed in the interaction, the 
purpose does not seem to codify the degree of commitment (although it 
may be an effect of meaning) but rather to introduce an argument author-
izing the enunciation. It is something like an implicit argument from author-
ity; an argumentative strategy similar to polyphonic authority (Ducrot 
1999 [1984]: 158). This assumption is consistent with the notion of justi-
fication proposed by Anderson (1986: 274): ‘Evidentials show the kind of 
justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that 
claim’ and ‘Evidentials are normally used in assertions (realis clauses), not 
in irrealis clauses, nor in presuppositions’ (277). The question is then why 
the speaker needs an argument from authority and why the speaker needs 
to justify his/her claim. In other words, in which contextual circumstances 
does the speaker prefer the marked form instead of the unmarked one? 
It is plausible to think that the answer lies in the interaction (Fox 2011; 
Nucholls and Michael 2014).
The evidential utterance introduced by así que: Form  
and meaning 
We begin with the following assumption: the mere presence of así que 
is not sufficient to deduce the existence of a source for what is said. In a 
sentence like Me trataban fatal. Así que me fui [I was treated badly, so I 
left], there is nothing in either the codified meaning of the conjunction or 
in the sentence structure which leads to the conclusion that the speaker 
is invoking a source for the content expressed in the clause. From this, 
it can be deduced that the conjunction does not have evidential mean-
ing in itself. In fact, if we take así que as an isolated word, we only know 
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two things: firstly, that there is something before and something after, 
that is, connective meaning, a connection instruction, the property of 
anaphoric deixis; secondly, that what comes after (the second member 
or consequent) is the conclusion or consequence of what was previously 
said (the first member or antecedent). This marks the emergence of con-
secutive meaning.7 
When it is used as a conjunction, the two members are explicit. 
However, así que is common in colloquial interactions, directly introduc-
ing a conversational turn, that is, in the absence of an explicit first member. 
Evidential meaning appears precisely in this type of cotext (see Rodríguez 
Ramalle 2014b: 134–135, and also 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2016). Hence, an utter-
ance such as ¿Así que eres profesora? 8 [so you are a teacher?] could be used by 
a speaker to start a conversation with someone showing only cordial interest. 
The situation could take place, for instance, at the departure lounge of an 
airport. The speaker has just heard two teenagers bid their farewells with 
the words ‘Goodbye, teacher!’. This sensory clue serves as her basis for the 
deduction, and the shared situation that explains that the interlocutor is 
not surprised that a stranger should be in possession of the aforementioned 
information about her profession. The utterance would be equally suitable 
if the speaker formulated it upon seeing some exams to be corrected on 
a table at which their interlocutor is sitting (inference based on sensory 
evidence), after discovering it via others or from the interlocutor him- or 
herself in a previous moment of utterance (reported evidence). The means 
of access and also the source are indeterminate. Note that all these cases 
7 As Álvarez points out (1999: §58.6.3, 3793), this meaning is compatible both with a 
cause-effect relationship: Mañana es fiesta (causa), así que no habrá clase (consecuencia) 
[Tomorrow is a holiday (cause), therefore there will be no class (consequence)], as well 
as with an explanation-deduction relationship: Mañana no habrá clase, así que es 
fiesta [Tomorrow there will be no class, so it is a holiday] according to how the clauses 
contained are ordered.
8 Although the tonal structure is interrogative, or nearly so, the utterance is assertive. 
Escandell Vidal 1999 speaks of ‘esquema entonativo circunflejo’ [circumflex intona-
tional pattern] (§61.3.1.1) and of ‘interrogativa atribuida’ [attributed interrogative 
type] (§61.5.1). The information is not wholly claimed: the propositional function 
is left open, or is presented as such. 
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are concerned with some knowledge that is presented as mediated in the 
sense given by Lazard (1999, 2001),9 that is, as indirectly acquired (hearsay 
or inference) from an indeterminate source. The features that the author 
ascribes to the mediative evidentials are also features that are possible to 
assign to the utterance introduced by así que: 
–  the speaker may choose between the unmarked register and the marked 
one; 
–  the marked register (the evidential forms) implies a reference to the 
acknowledgment of the event by the speaker; 
–  this reference is unspecified, consisting only of what may be paraphrased 
as ‘as it appears’; 
–  it creates a distance between the speaker and the speaker’s own discourse; 
–  in itself, it expresses neither dubiety nor presumption. (Lazard 2001: 
364).
It may also be noted that the absence of an explicit first member does 
not imply a vacuum in any way; on the contrary, there is an abundance 
of contextual information attained from indeterminate sources, which is 
incorporated in some way into the utterance. Anscombre (2011: 8) pro-
posed the concept of the ‘virtual utterance’:
an absence of a sign can be as significant as a physical presence: an absence of sign 
can be a real sign, and implicit is not the same as non-existent. […] A theory that 
uses the concept of virtual utterance starts from the hypothesis that a part of what 
is commonly called context (ie, enunciative circumstances) is not really context, but 
cotext, and implicit cotext besides.
[…] if we accept the notion of virtual utterance, we also accept that such utterances 
have a source (that is, an indicator of the origin of the information or the word) and 
9 The term mediativity is used in different ways in the bibliography. For example, 
Anscombre (2011 and 2014) include under the concept the three main types of 
access to information: ‘the inference (e.g. “I have proof ”), the perception (e.g. “I 
saw you”), and the loan (e.g. “they told me that …”)’ (Anscombre, 2011: 10). Lazard 
(1999, 2001) includes inference, loan and mirativity. Plungian (2001) distinguishes 
between direct, inferred, and mediated knowledge.
22 Eugenia Sainz
this allows us to relate phenomena such as negation, presupposition, etc. to other 
types of phenomena, namely, the mediative phenomena.
Ultimately, the hypothesis can be stated as follows: así que can intro-
duce a conclusion in the absence of an explicit first member. In this spe-
cific type of cotext, the problem of the anaphora conventionally imposed 
by the linguistic meaning of así que (connective instruction) is resolved 
with the inference of the existence of a source for what is said, with the 
consequent leap from sentence anaphora (conjunction) to discourse deixis 
(marker). Thus, we believe that evidential meaning is an utterance-type-
meaning which is obtained by default when the conjunction appears in 
this type of utterance (Levinson 2000) or discursive pattern (Taranilla 
2015),10 which is characterized by the presence of a virtual first member 
or implicit cotext that contains the information acquired indirectly from 
an indeterminate source. 
From a semantic point of view, our hypothesis is that the utterance 
introduced by así que has two evidential properties: first, as we have argued 
before, it is a sign of indirect evidence or mediativity (Lazard 1999, 2001), 
and secondly, it is a sign of intersubjectivity (Nuyts 2001, 2006, 2012), as 
confirmed by the inadequacy of (3b) and (3c). 
(3a) ¿Así que Sofía se ha comprado un coche? ¿Por qué no me lo has dicho?
 [So Sofía has bought herself a car? Why didn’t you tell me?]
(3b) ¿Así que Sofía se ha comprado un coche? #Me han dicho que tú no sabes nada.
 [So Sofía has bought herself a car? #I have been told you don´t know anything.]
(3c) ¿Así que Sofía se ha comprado un coche? #Tú no lo sabías, supongo. 
 [So Sofía has bought herself a car? #I guess you didn’t know anything.]
10 We share Taranilla’s words (2015: 236–237): ‘the discursive pattern contains proce-
dural meaning that can be added to the basic meaning of a particle, so that its nuclear 
semantics is enriched with secondary values. […] it is need to explore the discursive 
patterns in which a particle is traditionally embedded in order to systematize the 
updating of its secondary semantics’.
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The evidential utterance-type with así que compared with the 
evidential utterance-type with que
In order to better understand the issue, it can be useful to compare the 
utterance-type with así que to the one introduced by the conjunction que 
when used in the same cotextual circumstances, that is to say, in the absence 
of the first member.11 Our aim is to identify what joins and what separates 
the two utterances (4b) and (4c): 
(4a) Oye, Sofía se ha caído.
 [Listen, Sofía has fallen down.]
(4b) Oye, que Sofía se ha caído.
 [Listen, [I have heard / I have seen] that Sofía has fallen down.]
(4c) Oye, ¿así que Sofía se ha caído?
 [Listen, so Sofía has fallen down?]
We follow the distinctions suggested by Nuyts (2006: 18):
if one is talking about commitments, it is important to be able to make it very clear, 
in an immediate way, who is making them (performativity vs. descriptivity); and if 
one is concerned with attitudes, it is often essential to be able to make it clear whether 
one is alone in one’s views, has backing for them (subjectivity vs. intersubjectivity), 
is neutral, or is subjectively biased in one’s assessment (subjectivity vs. objectivity). 
In both cases: a) the two utterances are typical of colloquial interaction: 
the interlocutors know each other, their relationship is non-hierarchical, 
and they speak about everyday topics; b) the two utterances can function 
11 The conjunction que has been carefully studied and the bibliography is abundant: 
Reyes (1994), Porroche (2000, 2003), Pons Bordería (2003), Etxepare (2010), 
Demonte and Fernández-Soriano (2007, 2013), Gras (2012, 2016), Rodríguez Ramalle 
(2014b, 2016). Recently Rodríguez Ramalle (2016) has attributed the particle an 
evidential value in this type of utterance (see Anscrombre 2016, 2017 as well). 
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as the beginning of a speech event; c) they introduce an assertive speech 
act with its own illocutionary force, that is, they are not copies or echoes of 
a previous speech act, and they have assertive value; d) they legitimize the 
implicature of the existence of an indeterminate source of propositional 
content; and e) they legitimize the assumption that the source has been 
submitted to an evidential and epistemic evaluation by the speaker and 
that the speaker has deemed them to be trustworthy and the content to 
be truthful. Therefore, both of them are performative.
The differences are not less meaningful. First, an utterance such as Juan, 
que Sofía se ha caído. Ven, por favor [Juan, [I have heard / I have seen] that 
Sofía has fallen down. Please, come!] can be uttered by a speaker who has 
obtained the information via a third party (reported evidence) but also by 
one that was present during the subject’s fall (direct evidence). Then, this 
could be a case of mediativity, in the sense described by Anscombre (2011): 
The speaker repeats the information acquired by the senses or by hearsay. 
By contrast, the utterance introduced by así que presents the propositional 
content as the result of the speaker’s inference even in the event of senso-
rial perception. 
Secondly, subjectivity should be taken into account. The information 
of the clause that is introduced by que (que Sofía se ha caído) is private to the 
speaker and unknown to the listener: a situation of non-shared evidence 
or solely subjective evidence. Consequently, from an informational per-
spective, rhematic content, that is new data, is presented into the common 
base. By contrast, the content of the clause introduced by así que (¿Así que 
Sofía se ha caído?) is, or is presented as being, shared by the speaker and 
the interlocutor (or even by the whole community): a situation of shared 
evidence or intersubjective evidence. Therefore, from an informational 
perspective, thematic content, that is, shared knowledge is introduced (the 
information is not new for the interlocutor).12
12 It is interesting to observe that the leap from conjunction to discourse connective 
entails a change in the informational nature of the consequent: rhematic content in 
the first instance; thematic content in the second. Compare:
 (1a) Le trataron mal, así que se fue. 
 (1b) Oye ¿Así que se fue?
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Lastly, in the case of que, the responsibility for epistemic evaluation 
lies exclusively on the speaker because (s)he is the only one who has had 
access to the source and the knowledge. This means that the interlocutor 
may not share the same evaluation and the same conclusion that the speaker 
supports. In other words, (s)he should stop doing what (s)he was doing 
and help Sofia. By contrast, with así que the responsibility is presented as 
being shared and the content is presented as if it were true for both speaker 
and interlocutor since both have had access to the evidence. This means 
that they both share the same evaluation and support the same conclusion. 
The difference is important from an argumentative point of view and can 
explain the different use of the argument from authority in each case.
Approaching the evidential function: Subjectivization and 
strategic justification
As said above, our assumption is that the possession of a source, however 
indeterminate, functions as an argument from authority and the speaker 
uses it to justify his/her claim. It is plausible to hypothesize that the jus-
tification is strategic13 because the evidential is not compulsory, and it is 
also plausible to hypothesize that it may be sensitive to the communicative 
circumstances and if so, deictic (de Haan 2005). We suppose that the choice 
is conditioned by at least two factors: the type of information regarding 
13 Nuyts (2001) notices the importance of the active role of the speaker (how (s)he 
presents the facts) and the interaction partner (to what extent (s)he is willing to 
participate in the representation): 
   An important (but maybe not a necessary) element in how this distinction actu-
ally works may then be whether the interaction partner belongs to those sharing 
the evidence and the conclusions, or not. In fact, it is important to realize that in 
any construal of the dimension, its reflection in actual expressions of epistemic 
modality is a matter of how the speaker presents the situation (rather than of how 
it ‘really is’). In the present understanding of the dimension, then, the position of 
the interaction partner is likely to become critical. (Nuyts 2001: 394.)
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the participants (that is, the participants’ closeness to the information) and 
the speaker’s communicative aim. 
In fact, the first phenomenon that is observed is that the evidential 
formulation has a subjectivizing impact on the proposition. 
(5a)  Han cerrado el puente.
 [They have closed the bridge.]
(5b) Que han cerrado el puente.
 [[I have heard / I have seen] that they have closed the bridge.]
(5c) ¿Así que han cerrado el puente?
 [So they have closed the bridge?]
(6a) Se ha caído una niña.
 [Listen, a girl has fallen down.]
(6b) Que se ha caído una niña.
 [Listen, [I have heard / I have seen] that a girl has fallen down.]
(6c) ¿Así que se ha caído una niña?
 [Listen, so a girl has fallen down?]
The propositional content does not change but in the examples (b) 
and (c), the factual representation is intersubjectively biased towards the 
participants in the interaction. The information is presented as if it directly 
concerned the speaker and the interlocutor and as if they were personally 
affected to some extent. Hence, they also appear remarkably interested an 
even emotionally involved. The bridge that has been closed is not any bridge 
but the bridge that they cross every day to go to work. The girl is not any 
girl but one of the young girls enrolled in the summer camp supervised by 
them or by one of them. Our assumption is that it is the procedural form 
of the evidential utterance that projects the proposition in an intersubjec-
tive direction and transforms objective facts into (inter)subjective facts 
regarding the participants in the interaction. The bare objective informa-
tion becomes intersubjective information belonging to a shared informative 
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territory (Fox 2011).14 And vice versa: the territory of information to which 
the proposition belongs (ordinary events in everyday life) determines the 
choice of the marked form instead of the unmarked one, thus creating a 
relationship of closeness and intimacy and specific expectations of relevance. 
The utterance does not denote a bare state of affairs, but a state regard-
ing the speaker and the interlocutor: a well-known bridge and young girl, 
which are (a bridge and a young girl) intersubjectively biased.15 Similarly, 
the lexical items are intersubjectively biased because the hearer is asked 
to bring to memory only those lexical properties that agree with (that are 
consistent with) the purpose of the enunciation: the bridge is the bridge 
that the participants cross to go to the office; the girl is one of the young 
girls supervised by the speaker or/and the interlocutor. There is empathy, 
complicity and intimacy because the speaker presents himself as interested 
in the same information as the interlocutor. 
If our hypotheses were correct and could be accepted, the notion of rel-
evance might be understood not only with regard to the classic opposition 
new / old data for the listener but also with regard to the intersubjective bias 
of the information that is a deictic and social opposition: regarding / non 
regarding the participants in the interaction; close / far to them; belonging 
/ not belonging to their informative territory. For the listener of (5b) Que 
14 Fox (2011) focuses on the social notions of information ownership and territory of 
information. As Fox (2011: 174) explains, ‘the territory of information model describes 
what information “belongs” to the speaker, the hearer, everyone or some people non 
present. For example, a speaker may know something to be true but he/she may 
not be entitled to say it as bare fact, because this piece of information “belongs” to 
someone else.’ There seems to be ‘an apparently cross-culturally held belief that some 
information is “closer” or “belongs” to some participants while being “more distant” 
or “not owned by” others’ (175). ‘From these prior studies, we have reason to believe 
that “ownership” of information, the power and rights to claim information, and the 
obligations incurred by doing so, are implicated in evidence giving generally, and in 
evidential uses more specifically’ (176).
15 The evidential utterances introduced by así que and que constitute a good example 
of what Bermúdez (2005: 21) notes: ‘The modal markers are expression of the sub-
jectivity of the speaker while the evidential markers are related to the communicative 
situation as a whole (and especially to the listener and his capacity for evaluation) 
and therefore are inherently intersubjective.’
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han cerrado el puente, the closure of the bridge is new information; for the 
listener of (5c) ¿Así que han cerrado el puente?, the information is known. 
Nevertheless, in both cases, there are particular expectations of relevance 
because the evidential utterance presents the information as belonging to 
their territory and, therefore, as personally affecting them. 
The communicative aims are not less important because they give us 
the key to understanding why the speaker considers it useful to justify his/
her claim. In the first case, the speaker that chooses the evidential que (Oye, 
que han cerrado el puente) wants to do different things: to describe a state 
of affairs (assertive act); to express his/her concern (expressive act) and to 
convince him/her to do something (directive act). The evidential utter-
ance is a very complex illocutive act, not merely assertive but also expres-
sive, directive and argumentative. And we think it is again the evidential 
formulation that transforms the illocutive force. In this specific situation, 
it is plausible to suppose that having a source for what is said and allowing 
the inference of its existence seems to be strategically useful to achieve the 
goals. From a communicative and interactive point of view, the means of 
access to the knowledge (sensorial or reported evidence) or the specific ref-
erence of the source are not so central. What is really important is to have 
an argument from authority. The restricted access to knowledge (exclusive 
ownership) reinforces the utterance even more.
In the second case (¿Así que han cerrado el puente?), the evidential 
utterance allows a different strategy for a different communicative situa-
tion. The illocutive act is assertive and directive, although the proposition 
is unconfirmed information (Lazard 1999: 361–362). The speaker wants 
to approach the interlocutor and convince him to friendly talk about the 
bridge being closed or more precisely about his/her experience regarding 
the closure. Marking the utterance is strategically advantageous because 
it allows the speaker to appear as interested in a shared topic and, conse-
quently, as interested in the interlocutor. But there is another important 
factor influencing the choice of the intersubjective evidential así que. The 
interlocutor has had access to the piece of knowledge before the speaker 
and consequently owns it ‘more’ than him, that is, the interlocutor has more 
entitlement and more authority to it (Fox 2011). By contrast, the speaker 
is a newcomer to this piece of knowledge. So in this particular situation, 
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the evidential así que allows him/her to plan an interesting strategy pat-
tern. The speaker assumes his/her condition of newcomer, reduces his/her 
authority claims (not needed because the epistemic evaluation is shared), 
grants the ownership to the interlocutor and leaves the proposition open 
(unconfirmed) to be closed by him/her. The following example works as 
a successful polite strategy for breaking the ice: 
(7) Durante una reunión familiar en la casa de los Yoma, se sentaron en un sofá de 
tres cuerpos de color celeste, cada uno en un extremo. ‘¿Así que pintas?’, le preguntó 
Carlos Menem, mirando los cuadros que colgaban de la pared. Paisajes coloridos de 
pueblitos de la costa y retratos de la familia. (CREA: Wornat, Olga, Menem-Bolocco, 
2001)
[They sat down on a light-blue, three-seat sofa during a family gathering, each of 
them on an end. ‘So you paint?’, Carlos Menem asked him, looking at the pictures 
that were hanging on the wall. Colourful landscapes of coastline villages and family 
portraits.]
Intersubjective informative bias may also be emotion or expressivity 
when the piece of information moves the speaker emotionally:
(8) Olga estaba de pie junto al mesón, con un café humeante entre las manos. 
  – ¿Así que te vas? – dijo sin mirarme, sorbiendo cautelosamente de su taza–. 
¿Por un año entero?
  – Hasta el próximo verano –corroboré. 
  Hizo una pausa, acariciando el borde de la taza con el dedo.
  – Te echaremos de menos – insistió, aún sin mirarme–. Eres parte ya de nosotros, 
Marcos. (CREA: Collyer, Jaime (2002): El hablante del cielo)
  [Olga was standing next to the tavern, holding a steaming coffee in her hands.
  ‘so you are leaving?’, she said without looking at me, carefully sipping her cup. 
‘for one whole year?’
 ‘Until next summer’, I confirmed.
  She paused for a moment, caressing the top of the cup with her finger.
  ‘We will miss you’, she insisted without looking at me yet. ‘You are already part 
of us, Marcos.’]
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The pragmatic strategy allowed by the evidential is particularly useful 
in the colloquial interaction because of discursive functions, such as intro-
ducing a new discursive topic (¿Así que han despedido a Jaime? [so they have 
sacked Jaime?]) or resuming an interrupted one (¿Así que conoces a María? 
[so you know María?]). It presents them as shared and relevant informa-
tion, interesting for both speaker and interlocutor. An utterance-type like 
¿Así que ha dimitido el presidente? [so the president has resigned?] invokes 
some knowledge that is shared by the entire linguistic community in terms 
of citizens of the same state. It can function to introduce a new topic into 
the discourse because it is based on the assumption that both parties are 
interested in the national politics, and it takes for granted the truth of the 
news reported in the press or on the television. The utterance allows the 
speaker to appear interested in the interlocutor (¿Así que te vas a Alemania 
la próxima semana? [so you are going to Germany next week?]) and even 
emotionally involved (¿Así que te vas? [so you are going?]). Intersubjectivity 
is also inter-responsibility and, because of that, the utterance-type can be 
used for requesting an explanation for something that has happened by 
expressing certainty and evidence. (Por cierto, Pablo, ¿Así que no has enviado 
el informe? [By the way, Pablo, so you have not sent the file?]). An utterance 
like ¿Así que me traicionas? [so you are betraying me?] at the beginning of 
the speech event that is said to a friend, a colleague or a partner is the same 
as saying ‘I know that it is true and you also know that it is true.’ The force 
of the argumentation lies precisely in the possession of a source (authority) 
and the situation of shared evidence. 
Sometimes the evidential utterance seems to approach reformulation16 
and así que can be commutable with a reformulation marker as o sea que. 
Note the following examples: 
(9a)  – Me obligaron a reconocer mi culpa y me comunicaron que en cuanto Lolita 
se fuera, yo también debía marcharme. Sin ella no van a necesitarme.
16 The NGLE states (§46.12l), ‘Many illative conjunctions start the period and even 
the discourse turn-taking. When they start a question, usually a recapitulation is 
formulated, sometimes unexpectedly, or that we ask for an explanation of what has 
been said’. For the relationship between reformulation and conclusion, see Pons 2013 
and Murillo (2016), with opposing positions. 
Evidentiality, intersubjectivity and ownership of the information 31
  – Así que Lolita se ha ido … / O sea que Lolita se ha ido …
  Miss Francia asintió: Las lágrimas de la garganta apiñadas en los ojos. 
  (CREA corpus: Salisach, Mercedes 1975: La gangrena, Planeta, Barcelona, 
1976)
  [They forced me to acknowledge my blame and told me that as soon as Lola 
left, I had to leave, too. Without her, they are not going to need me.
 ‘So Lolita has left …/ You mean that Lolita has left …’
 Miss France nodded: tears from her throat packed in her eyes.]
(9b)  Un día nos habló de don Pablo. Nos confió el gran secreto. ‘Nadie en el Banco 
lo sabe: únicamente don Alberto y mi pobre Jaume conocían la verdad.’ Mi 
madre, al oírla, se quedó algo avergonzada. Le costaba creer lo que Angelina 
nos decía. Entonces aquellos casos eran muy raros y despertaban recelos. ‘Es 
una buena persona … Pero no se veía con ánimo para ejercer su ministerio. 
Colgó los hábitos y se echó a vivir.’ 
  – Así que don Pablo es sacerdote. / O sea que don Pablo es sacerdote.
  – De pies a cabeza.
  – Pero … ¿Cómo hizo eso?
  (CREA corpus: Salisach, Mercedes 1975: La gangrena, Planeta, Barcelona, 
1976)
  [Once she told us about don Pablo. She told us the big secret. ‘Nobody at the 
Bank knows it: only don Alberto and my poor Jaume knew the truth.’ When 
she heard her, my mother got a bit ashamed. It was hard for her to believe 
what Angelina was telling us. Back then, those cases were very rare and used 
to arouse distrust. ‘He is a good person … But he didn’t feel like performing 
his ministry. He left the priesthood and started to live.’
 ‘So don Pablo is a priest. / You mean that don Pablo is a priest.’
 ‘From head to toe.’
 ‘But … how did he do that?’]
Nonetheless, it is very interesting to note that these are not equivalent 
discursive forms. The speaker’s modal attitude with regard to the content 
is different. The evidential utterance is a signal that Lolita’s leaving home 
and don Pablo’s religious calling are two pieces of information that belong 
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to the intersubjective territory, and, therefore, there is personal interest 
and emotional involvement. The speaker who chooses the evidential así 
que is (or wants to appear) personally interested in the information pro-
vided by the interlocutor (¿Así que don Pablo es sacerdote?) or even emo-
tionally involved in the facts described (¿Así que te vas? ¿Así que Lolita 
se ha ido?). By contrast, the reformulation utterance containing o sea que 
expresses a more objective attitude with respect to a piece of information 
that falls outside the intersubjective territory. The commutation of the 
evidential así que by the reformulation particle causes a loss of subjective 
involvement. The speaker is not personally affected by this information. 
(S)he only wants to make sure that his/her conclusion is true. Hence, (s)he 
seems less interested or only interested in the objective data (¿O sea que 
don Pablo es sacerdote?) and less emotionally involved in the facts (¿O sea 
que te vas? ¿O sea que Lolita se ha ido?). Intersubjectivity does not seem to 
be only a matter of shared information, shared epistemic evaluation and 
shared conclusion, but also shared territory, shared informative interests, 
subjective attitude and emotional involvement. It is an interesting issue 
that deserves further investigation. 
Conclusions
Our analysis yielded several conclusions. Firstly, the assumption that the 
function of evidentials is epistemic does not help us to understand the rea-
sons that lead speakers to choose them. When observed in the interaction, 
their purpose does not seem to be epistemic, but rather to introduce an 
implicit argument that authorizes the enunciation and justifies the illocu-
tive act. The question is then why the speaker needs to justify his/her claim.
Secondly, the evidential utterance introduced by the illative conjunc-
tion así que is considered. The assumption is made that the evidential inter-
pretation is not linked to the conjunction, but rather to a specific type of 
utterance (Levinson 2000) or discursive pattern (Taranilla 2015) that is 
characterized by the presence of a virtual first member or implicit cotext 
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which contains the information acquired indirectly from an indetermi-
nate source. It is plausible to hypothesize two evidential properties: indi-
rect evidence (inference and hearsay) from indeterminate sources (that 
is, mediativity in the sense of Lazard 2001) and intersubjectivity (Nuyts 
2001, 2006, 2012); that is to say, thematic content, shared responsibility.
Thirdly, the evidential utterance introduced by así que has been com-
pared with that introduced by the conjunction que. As a result, important 
differences have been noticed. In particular, the latter one is, first, a signal of 
reported evidence but also direct sensorial evidence (mediative in the sense 
of Anscombre 2011) and, secondly, a signal of solely subjective evidence 
(rhematic content, exclusive responsibility of the speaker). 
Fourthly, the function of the two evidential utterances in the interac-
tion have been analysed and an interesting feature has been highlighted. The 
evidential utterance is a signal of intersubjective information belonging to a 
shared informative territory. In both cases the evidential utterance projects 
the proposition in an intersubjective direction and transforms the objective 
facts into (inter)subjective ones regarding the participants in the interac-
tion. The information is presented as if it directly concerned the speaker 
and the interlocutor and as if they were personally affected to some extent. 
Hence, they also appear very interested and even emotionally involved.
Finally, the analysis seems to confirm Anderson’s hypothesis (1986). 
The evidential functions as an argument from authority to justify the claim. 
The justification is strategic. In the utterance introduced by que, the eviden-
tial contributes to reinforce the speaker’s authority. The utterance intro-
duced by así que allows a different strategy for a different communicative 
situation. The interlocutor has accessed knowledge before the speaker and 
consequently owns it ‘more’ than him, that is, (s)he has more entitlement 
and more authority to it. By contrast, the speaker is a newcomer to this 
knowledge. In this particular situation, the evidential así que allows him/
her to plan an interesting strategy. The speaker assumes his/her condition 
of newcomer, reduces his/her authority claims, grants the ownership to the 
interlocutor and leaves the proposition open (unconfirmed) to be closed 
by him/her. This strategic pattern is particularly useful in the Spanish col-
loquial interaction. It is an interesting issue worthy of more careful study 
and investigation.
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